China is considering tightening export controls on its home-grown artificial intelligence models and the chips they use, according to the Financial Times, in a move that could push Beijing’s technology defenses beyond the raw materials and equipment it already guards.
The newspaper, citing two people involved in the talks, said regulators led by the Commerce Department had been consulting with leading domestic AI and chipmaking groups about possible safeguards.
Nothing has been decided, and it’s not clear whether either method will work anytime soon.
The talks are the latest sign that the world’s second-largest economy is beginning to treat its leading AI as a commodity to be protected rather than shared, a mirror image of the American ways that pushed Chinese firms into custom ASICs in the first place.
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According to the FT, officials are weighing a review of the export list that includes AI- and chip-related goods, clear licensing conditions, strict end-user inspections, and higher barriers to transferring technology abroad.
The stated aim, the report says, is to stop China’s most advanced systems and its fast-growing startups from being taken over by the West.
The chip feature is a new part of the picture. Beijing already bans exports of rare earths and certain semiconductor materials, but folding completed AI accelerators, and the models trained on them, into a formal licensing regime would mark a broader shift in how it applies industrial policy.
Most of the groundwork was done earlier this month. Reuters reported that the commerce department held talks with Alibaba, ByteDance, and Z.ai startup about limiting overseas access to their flagship apps, including Alibaba’s Qwen, ByteDance’s Doubao, and Z.ai’s GLM-5.2.
Those talks, according to Reuters, covered both closed-loop models and floated a phased review where border systems could be kept entirely in-house.
Details remain slim for now. The people cited by the FT did not say which chips would be covered, what performance restrictions might apply, or how open-source releases would be handled, and the ministry has yet to publish a draft.
China’s commerce ministry has not publicly commented on the report, and none of the companies mentioned in previous talks have confirmed the talks.
That silence is notable, because Beijing rarely telegraphs export policy before it arrives, and officials stressed to Reuters that the mitigation measures would only apply to future models.
Behind it is a chip battle that has been raging for several years. Washington has gradually tightened its own controls, most recently moving to close a loophole that allows Nvidia’s high-end chips to reach Chinese buyers through offshore companies, while relying on allies to determine chip-making equipment.
Beijing has responded with unusual global restrictions and antitrust probes, and now, it seems, it may be learning its own tools.
If China halts its AI export program, the decline will reach beyond the United States. As Decoder noted, European developers and small firms have begun to rely on freely downloadable Chinese models as a cheaper alternative to American services that can find that door narrowing.
Next, if anything comes up, is the licensing framework and the fine print that can explain it.
Analysts expect any rules to start with more efficient systems and future model generations rather than software already circulating in the wild, although the FT’s sources warned that systems could change or be shelved.
There is also a bargaining dimension. Some observers read the reversal as a boon for a broader trade deal, as Beijing has separately pressured Washington to ease its chip curbs.
In a country that has spent the past decade reviling targeted export controls, creating its own would be a significant change, and whether it becomes a wall or remains a bargaining chip, the report said, may not be clear until officials write something.
